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ABSTRACT
NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CLAIM BASED ESTATE
DIVISION PROBLEMS
I˙NEL, Abdulkadir
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Emin Karago¨zogˇlu
July 2014
Estate division game is an allocation of an estate between players based on
a rule. In this thesis, we consider estate division games and study the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for division rules under which Nash equilibria
induce equal division. Ashlagi, Karago¨zogˇlu, Klaus (2012) introduce classes
of properties for division rules and show that they are sufficient for all Nash
equilibria to induce equal division. In this study, we propose a different prop-
erty, namely conditional full compensation, and prove that it is also a sufficient
condition for division rules in order for all Nash equilibria outcomes under
these rules to be equal division. We, then, show that under any rule satisfying
claims boundedness and conditional equal division lower bound, equal division
is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Finally, we prove that letting at least one
player get more than the difference between the whole estate and the sum of
other players’ claims is a necessary condition for all Nash equilibria to induce
equal division.
Keywords : Estate division game, division rule, Nash equilibrium, equal divi-
sion.
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O¨ZET
TALEBE DAYALI VARLIK PAYLAS¸IM
PROBLEMLERI˙NDE NASH DENGELERI˙
I˙NEL, Abdulkadir
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yard. Doc¸. Emin Karago¨zogˇlu
Temmuz 2014
Paylas¸ım oyunu bir varlıgˇın oyuncular arasında bir kurala go¨re paylas¸tırılmasıdır.
Bu tez c¸alıs¸mamızda, varlık paylas¸ım oyunları ele alınmakta ve bu oyun-
ların Nash dengelerinde es¸it paylas¸ımı veren bo¨lu¨nme kurallarının gereklilik
ve yeterlilik s¸artları incelenmektedir. Ashlagi, Karago¨zogˇlu, Klaus (2012)
bo¨lu¨nme kuralları ic¸in o¨zellik sınıfları sunuyorlar ve bu sınıfların tu¨m Nash
dengelerinin es¸it paylas¸ımı vermesi ic¸in yeterli oldug˘unu go¨steriyorlar. Bu
c¸alıs¸mamızda farklı bir o¨zellik, yani s¸artlı tam tazminat, o¨nerilmekte ve bunun
tu¨m Nash dengelerinde es¸it paylas¸ımı veren paylas¸ım kuralları ic¸in yeterli
kos¸ul oldug˘u go¨sterilmektedir. Daha sonra taleplerin monotonlug˘u ve s¸artlı
es¸it paylas¸ım alt sınırını sag˘layan herhangi bir paylas¸ım kuralı altında oy-
nanan oyunda, es¸it paylas¸ımın bir Nash dengesi oldug˘u go¨sterilmektedir. Son
olarak, en az bir oyuncunun varlıktan dig˘er talepler c¸ıkarıldıg˘ında kalan mik-
tardan fazla almasının, tu¨m Nash dengelerinin es¸it paylas¸ımı vermesi ic¸in
gerekli bir kos¸ul oldug˘u ispatlanmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Varlık paylas¸ım oyunu, paylas¸ım kuralı, Nash dengesi,
es¸it paylas¸ım.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Estate division game is a situation in which a perfectly divisible good is to be
distributed among a group of players. Each player lays a claim on the good
and an authority in charge is to divide the good based on players’ claims.
If the total demand does not exceed the amount of the good, giving each
player what they claim might be a reasonable solution. The problem occurs
when the total demand exceeds the good, and therefore, cannot be met. The
model described here is also known as a claim game, and the rule that is
used to divide the good is called a division rule. The case where the good is
insufficient to meet the demand is called a bankruptcy problem. In this paper,
in general, we deal with claim games and their Nash equilibrium outcomes
induced by certain classes of division rules. We study non-cooperative games
in which there is an estate with positive value to be allocated among players,
who are rewarded with an amount of the estate based on their claims and
the division rule.1 Here, we are interested in the relationship between pure
strategy Nash equilibria of claim games and equal division of the estate. We
do not work with a specific division rule. Instead, we try to determine the
properties that division rules must satisfy in order for equal division to be
induced by a Nash equilibrium.
1Every claim is basically a nonnegative amount of the estate and does not exceed the
estate.
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In the literature, the article closely related to our paper is Ashlagi, Karago¨zogˇlu,
Klaus (2012). They study estate division problems and analyze their Nash
equilibria. They offer properties for division rules so that all Nash equilib-
ria under these rules induce equal division. They first show that if a divi-
sion rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment of equals and order preservation
of awards properties, then (i) all agents claiming the largest possible amount
is a Nash equilibrium and (ii) all Nash equilibria lead to equal division of
the estate. Here, equal treatment of equals property requires the rule to re-
ward the agents with identical claims with equal amounts. Moreover, if a
rule satisfies order preservation of awards property, then an agent who claims
more than some other agent cannot get less than the amount the latter agent
receives. They, then, prove that changing order preservation of awards prop-
erty with claims monotonicity property does not affect the first part of the
result found before, but for the second part to hold, the number of players
should not be larger than three.That is, (i) under any division rule satisfying
these properties, all agents claiming the largest amount possible is a Nash
equilibrium, and (ii) if the number of players is less than or equal to three,
all Nash equilibria of the estate division game lead to equal division. They
give an example to show that the second part does not have to hold with
these properties if there are more than three agents (see Ashlagi et al., 2012,
Example 1). Finally, they verify that if a division rule satisfies efficiency,
equal treatment of equals, claims monotonicity and nonbossiness properties,
then equal division prevails in all Nash equilibria. Here, nonbossiness prop-
erty implies that if an agent changes his claim and still gets the same reward
as before, then all other players’ rewards also remain the same.
Cetemen and Karago¨zogˇlu (2014) is also related to our paper in the sense
that they consider the division of a dollar among players and examine Nash
equilibria of this game. In a standard Divide-the-Dollar game (DD), which
is basically a claim game played by players who make claims on one dollar,
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players get what they claim if the total demand does not exceed one dollar,
and get nothing otherwise. The authors introduce an altered version of DD,
and call it DD′. Unlike DD, the altered version DD′ is played in two stages: In
the first stage, players make claims simultaneously. If the total demand does
not exceed one dollar, each player gets their claims. Otherwise, the players
move to the second round. In this stage, player with the lower claim at the
first stage suggests the amount to be deducted from each player’s demand.
If other player accepts it, players are awarded with the offer. If the offer
is rejected, both players get zero. They show that in DD′, there is unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where players make egalitarian demands
in the first stage.
Brams and Taylor (1994) try to make the payoffs of DD less severe by mak-
ing some changes over the rules of the game. They offer a “reasonable” rule
scheme which leads to equal division of the dollar if all agents make egalitar-
ian demands, which is a Nash equilibrium of this game. The authors prove
that there is no “reasonable” payoff scheme for DD that yields egalitarian
behavior.
In this thesis, we use a property, conditional full compensation (CFC),
and show that all Nash equilibria of a claim game played under CFC induce
equal division. Properties for division rules that lead to equal division in all
Nash equilibria are also studied in Ashlagi et al. (2012). Nevertheless, none of
these properties are necessary conditions for a rule to satisfy CFC. Therefore,
we provide a different sufficient condition for all Nash equilibria outcomes to
be equal division. We, then, show that if a rule satisfies claims boundedness
and conditional equal division lower bound (CED), equal division is a Nash
equilibrium outcome. This result might not say much about claim games
played by more than two players. But if the game is played with two players,
a rule satisfying claims boundedness and CED also satisfies some well-known
properties, which are studied in Ashlagi et al (2012), namely equal treatment
3
of equals, order preservation of awards and nonbossiness. Lastly, we present a
necessary property for division rules in order for all Nash equilibria outcomes
to be equal division under these rules. We, first, require the division rule to
satisfy efficiency and claims boundedness if the total claim does not exceed
the estate. Then, we prove that if all Nash equilibria outcomes of a claim
game are equal division, there is one player such that the sum of his reward
and other players’ claims exceed the estate. That is, there exists at least a
player who gets more than whatever is left after others’ claims are deducted
from the estate.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CLAIM GAME
2.1 The Model
Let E denote the estate which is to be divided among a group N of agents
who have claims over E, with E > 0 and N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Here, E is an
infinitely divisible resource and n ≥ 2, n ∈ N. Let each agent’s preference
be strictly monotone over the amount of the estate they receive. Moreover,
let Ci = [0, E] be the strategy set of player i ∈ N . Let a strategy for player
i be a claim ci with ci ∈ Ci. Assume that claims are known to all agents
and the authority who is responsible for dividing the estate. Let c be a
claims vector and C ≡ (Ci)i∈N be the claims space such that c ∈ C ⊂ Rn.
Now, for any c ∈ C and S ⊂ N with S 6= ∅, let cS denote the sum of the
claims made by agents who belong to set S, i.e., cS =
∑
i∈S ci. For each
i, let C−i denote the cartesian product of claims space of all players except
player i, i.e., C−i ≡ (Cj)j∈N/{i}. Also let (c¯i, c−i) ∈ C be the claims vector
obtained from c = (ci, c−i) ∈ C, by changing player i’s claim from ci to c¯i with
c−i ∈ C−i and ci, c¯i ∈ Ci. Let Ri be a real-valued outcome function on the set
of claims such that Ri : C → R+ with
∑
i∈N Ri(c) ≤ E. Let R : C → Rn+ be
such that R(c) ≡ (Ri(c))i∈N for any c ∈ C. Here, R is called a division rule
that rewards player i with Ri(c), when the claim vector of the players is c.
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A claim game, denoted as Γ (R), is the division of the estate E based on R
between n players who make their claims simultaneously.
2.2 Some Properties for Division Rules
In this paper, we analyze certain division rule classes under which a Nash
equilibrium has a relation to equal division, and study some basic properties
that these rule classes satisfy.2 One of these properties is claims boundedness,
which is described as follows:
Claims boundedness: For any agent, the reward for any claim made by
the agent should not be greater than the claim itself. That is, ∀i ∈ N , we
have Ri(c) ≤ ci.
This property is usually considered essential for the division rules. There
are other properties that are used in Ashlagi et al. (2012). Since this paper
is intended to be built mainly on Ashlagi et al. (2012), we also study those
properties which are as follows:
Efficiency: Whole estate should be allocated if there are “enough” demand
for it. That is, if cN ≥ E, then we should have RN(c) = E.
Claims monotonicity: If an agent increases his claim, he should not be
rewarded less as long as other players do not make changes in theirs. That
is, if c¯i > ci with c¯i ∈ Ci, then we have Ri(c¯i, c−i) ≥ Ri(ci, c−i).
Equal treatment of equals: Any two agents with identical claims get the
same amounts of the estate. That is, for any i, j ∈ N , ci = cj implies
Ri(c) = Rj(c).
Order preservation of awards: Between any two agents, the one with the
higher claim should not be rewarded less than the other. That is, if ci > cj,
we should have Ri(c) ≥ Rj(c).
Nonbossiness: No agent can change what other agents get without chang-
2These properties are obtained from Thomson (2010).
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ing his own award. That is, for any i, j ∈ N , if Ri(c¯i, c−i) = Ri(ci, c−i) with
c¯i ∈ Ci, we should have Rj(c¯i, c−i) = Rj(ci, c−i).
There are a couple of properties that make two main results in this pa-
per possible, and therefore, are very crucial to us; namely, conditional equal
division lower bounds and conditional full compensation, which are described
as below:
Conditional equal division lower bounds, CED: For any i ∈ N , we have
Ri(c) ≥ min{ci, En }.3
Conditional full compensation, CFC: For any i ∈ N , if∑j∈N min{ci, cj} ≤
E, then we have Ri(c) = ci.
Ashlagi et al. (2012) also give a definition of equal division of an estate
E, which we use throughout this paper.
Equal division: Given an estate E and a set of players N , the vector
(E
n
, · · · , E
n
) ∈ Rn++ denotes equal division of E.
3This bound is proposed by Moulin (2002).
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CHAPTER 3
EQUAL DIVISION AND NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
3.1 Nash Equilibrium of Γ(R) under CFC
We study claim based division games with n ∈ N − {0, 1} players who are
to put forward claims on E. Now, we look for sufficient conditions for the
division rules in order for all Nash equilibrium outcome to be equal division.
It should be noted that we do not fix any rule for the claim games. We
work only with the properties the division rule satisfies. In the following
proposition, we show that if a division rule R satisfies CFC, then all Nash
equilibria of Γ (R) give us equal division.
Proposition 1. Let R be a division rule satisfying CFC. Then, c = (E
n
, . . . , E
n
)
is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game Γ(R). Moreover, all Nash equilibria
of Γ(R) lead to equal division of E.
Proof. Let c = (E
n
, . . . , E
n
). For any player i ∈ N , let c′i be a claim with c′i 6= En
and c′ = (c′i, c−i). For all j ∈ N − {i}, we have
∑
k∈N
min{c′j, c′k} =
∑
k∈N
min{E
n
, c′k} ≤
∑
k∈N
E
n
≤ E.
This implies that Rj(c
′) = E
n
because R satisfies CFC. Since it is true for all
8
j ∈ N − {i}, we have Ri(c′) ≤ E −
∑
j∈N/{i}Rj(c
′) = E
n
. That is, c is a Nash
equilibrium. In order to prove the second part, assume to the contrary that
there exists a Nash equilibrium c∗ of Γ(R) with R(c∗) 6= (E
n
, . . . , E
n
). Then,
there exists i ∈ N such that Ri(c∗) < En .
Claim 1. If ck =
E
n
for some k ∈ N , then Rk(ck, c−k) = En for any c−k ∈ C−k.
Proof. For any j, we have min{E
n
, cj} ≤ En . Then,
∑
j∈N
min{ck, cj} = E
n
+
∑
j∈N\{k}
min{E
n
, cj} ≤ E
n
+
∑
j∈N\{k}
E
n
= E.
Then, Rk(ck, c−k) = En by CFC property.
Now, let c¯i =
E
n
with c¯i ∈ Ci. Then, we have Ri(c¯i, c∗−i) = En > Ri(c∗),
where equality comes from Claim 1, a contradiction. Therefore, c∗ is not a
Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1. A division rule R satisfying CFC does not have to satisfy efficiency,
claims monotonicity, equal treatment of equals, order preservation of awards
or nonbossiness.
Remark 1 implies that a division rule satisfying CFC does not necessarily
meet the conditions required in the results established in Ashlagi et al. (2012,
Theorem 1, 2, and 3). Therefore, Proposition 1 provides an alternative
sufficient condition for division rules under which all Nash equilibria outcome
are equal division.
3.2 Equal Division under CED
In the following proposition, we prove that if a division rule R satisfies claims
boundedness and CED, and if there is a claim vector c ∈ C which leads to
equal division of the estate among the players under R, then c is a Nash
equilibrium of the claim game Γ(R).
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Proposition 2. Let R be a division rule satisfying claims boundedness and
CED. Then, equal division of E is a Nash equilibrium outcome of Γ(R).
Proof. Assume there is a c∗ ∈ C such that Ri(c∗) = En for all i ∈ N . Suppose,
to the contrary, there exists a player j with j ∈ N who has a better response c′j
to c∗−j than c
∗
j , with c
′
j, c
∗
j ∈ Cj and c∗−j ∈ C−j. That is, Rj(c′) > Rj(c∗) = En ,
where c′ = (c′j, c
∗
−j). Then, there exists at least a player k with k ∈ N who
gets less than E
n
when c = c′. That is, Rk(c′) < En , since
∑
iRi(c) ≤ E for any
c ∈ C. Moreover, since R satisfies claims boundedness property, we also have
c∗k ≥ Rk(c∗) = En with c∗k ∈ Ck. So, we have c∗k ≥ En . However, since player k
does not change his claim, i.e., c∗k = c
′
k, we must have Rk(c
′) ≥ min{c∗k, En } =
E
n
. A contradiction. Therefore, c∗j is a best response to c
∗
−j for player j. That
is, c∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (R).
We, next, determine the properties that the types of division rules stud-
ied in Proposition 2, i.e., the division rules satisfying claims boundedness
and CED, satisfy. We first show with the following proposition that claims
boundedness and CED properties are sufficient for a division rule to satisfy
equal treatment of equals when there are 2 players in the game.
Proposition 3. Let R be a division rule satisfying claims boundedness and
CED. If n=2, then R also satisfies equal treatment of equals.
Proof. Let n = 2, c1 ∈ C1 and c2 ∈ C2. Let, also, c = (c1, c2) with c1 =
c2 = c¯. If c¯ ≤ E2 , then c¯ ≥ R1(c) ≥ min{c¯, E2 } = c¯, where the first inequality
is due to claims boundedness property. Therefore, R1(c) = c¯. Using the
same argument, we get R2(c) = c¯. So, c1 = c2 implies R1(c) = R2(c). If
c¯ > E
2
, then Ri(c) ≥ min{c¯, E2 } = E2 for i = 1, 2. Together with the fact
that
∑
iRi(c¯) ≤ E, we have R1(c) = R2(c) = E2 . Therefore, R satisfies
equal treatment of equals.
With the following remarks, we show that if either claims boundedness
property or n = 2 is not satisfied, then Proposition 3 no longer has to hold.
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Remark 2. A division rule R with CED does not have to satisfy equal treatment
of equals when n=2. For instance; let n=2, E=1, c1 = c2 = 0 and R1(c1, c2) =
1 and R2(c1, c2) = 0. Here, Ri(ci, c−i) ≥ min{ci, 12} for all i, i.e., it satisfies
the required property but it does not satisfy equal treatment of equals.
Remark 3. A division rule R with claims boundedness and CED does not
have to satisfy equal treatment of equals. For instance; let n=3, E=1, c1 =
c2 =
1
2
, c3 =
1
4
, R1(c) =
5
12
, R2(c) =
1
3
and R3(c) =
1
4
with c = (c1, c2, c3).
Here, ci =
1
2
≥ Ri(c) ≥ 13 = min{ci, 13} for i=1,2 and c3 = 14 ≥ R3(c) ≥ 14 =
min{c3, 13}, i.e., R satisfies claims boundedness and CED, but R1 6= R2, even
though we have c1 = c2.
We then show with the following proposition that claims boundedness and
CED are sufficient for a division rule to satisfy order preservation of awards
when there are 2 players in the game.
Proposition 4. Let R be a division rule satisfying claims boundedness and
CED. If n=2, then R also satisfies order preservation of awards.
Proof. Let N = {1, 2}, c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2 and c = (c1, c2). Assume, without
loss of generality, that c1 ≤ c2. Now, we have three cases to analyze:
(a) If c1 ≤ c2 ≤ E2 , we have R1(c) = c1 ≤ c2 = R2(c), where equalities come
from CED and claims boundedness properties.
(b) If c1 ≤ E2 ≤ c2, we have R1(c) = c1 ≤ E2 = min{c2, E2 } ≤ R2(c).
(c) If E
2
≤ c1 ≤ c2, we have R1(c) = R2(c) = E2 , since
∑
iRi(c) ≤ E.
Therefore, c1 ≤ c2 implies that R1(c) ≤ R2(c), i.e., R satisfies order preservation
of awards.
With the following remarks, we show that if either claims boundedness or
n = 2 is not satisfied, then Proposition 4 no longer has to hold.
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Remark 4. A division rule R with CED does not have to satisfy order preservation
of awards when n=2. For instance; let n=2, E=1, c1 < c2 <
1
2
and R1(c1, c2) =
1
2
and R2(c1, c2) = c2. Here, R satisfies CED clearly. However, R1(c) 
 R2(c)
even though we have c1 ≤ c2.
Remark 5. A division rule R with claims boundedness and CED does not
have to satisfy order preservation of awards. For instance; let n=3, E=1,
c1 =
1
2
, c2 =
1
2
− ε with ε < 1
6
, c3 =
1
6
. Now, let c = (c1, c2, c3) and let
R1(c) =
1
3
, R2(c) =
1
2
− ε and R3(c) = 16 . Here, we have c2 ≤ c1 and
R2(c) 
 R1(c) even though R satisfies claims boundedness and CED.
We finally show in the following proposition that claims boundedness and
CED are sufficient for a division rule to satisfy nonbossiness when there are
2 players in the game.
Proposition 5. Let R be a division rule satisfying claims boundedness and
CED. If n=2, then R also satisfies nonbossiness.
Proof. Let n = 2; c1, c¯1 ∈ C1 with c1 6= c¯1; c2 ∈ C2, c = (c1, c2) and c′ =
(c¯1, c2).
(a) Assume that c1 <
E
2
. If c¯1 <
E
2
, we have R1(c) = c1 6= c¯1 = R1(c′). If
c¯1 ≥ E2 , we have R1(c) = c1 < E2 ≤ min{c¯1, E2 } ≤ R1(c′). Therefore, it
is not possible for player 1 to keep his reward the same but change his
claim, when at least one of his claims is less than E
2
.
(b) Now assume that c1, c¯1 ≥ E2 . Assume further, that R1(c) = R1(c′). If
c2 <
E
2
, we have R2(c) = c2 = R2(c
′) because of claims boundedness
and CED, i.e., the second player’s reward does not change. If c2 ≥ E2 ,
then R2(c) ≥ min{c2, E2 } ≥ E2 . Together with the fact that R1(c) ≥
min{c1, E2 } ≥ E2 , we must have R1(c) = R2(c) = E2 . Similarly, we
have R2(c
′) ≥ min{c2, E2 } ≥ E2 . Since R1(c′) = R1(c) = E2 , we have
R2(c
′) = E
2
. That is, the second player’s reward does not change if
player 1 gets the same amount as before.
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Therefore, Ri(c) = Ri(c
′) implies Rj(c) = Rj(c′) for all c, c′ ∈ C and all
i, j ∈ N .
With the following remarks, we show that if either claims boundedness or
n = 2 is not satisfied, then Proposition 5 no longer has to hold.
Remark 6. A division rule R with CED does not have to satisfy nonbossiness
when n=2. For instance; let n=2, E=1, c1 = 0, c¯1 =
1
4
, c2 =
1
2
, c = (c1, c2)
and c′ = (c¯1, c2). Now, let R1(c) = R1(c′) = 14 , R2(c) =
3
4
and R2(c
′) = 1
2
.
Clearly, R satisfies CED. However, we R2(c) 6= R2(c′) even though we have
R1(c) = R1(c
′).
Remark 7. A division rule R with claims boundedness and CED does not
have to satisfy nonbossiness. For instance; let n=3, E=1, c1 = c2 =
4
9
,
c3 =
1
9
and c¯1 =
1
2
. Let, also, c = (c1, c2, c3) and c
′ = (c¯1, c2, c3). Now, let
R1(c) = R1(c
′) = R2(c) = 49 , R2(c
′) = 1
3
, R3(c) = R3(c
′) = 1
9
. Here, we have
R1(c) = R1(c
′) and R2(c) 6= R2(c′). That is, R satisfies claims boundedness
and CED but it does not satisfy nonbossiness.
Note that, claims boundedness and CED are not sufficient for a division
rule to satisfy efficiency or claims monotonicty (see Appendix 4.1).
3.3 Necessary Properties for Equal Division
at Nash Equilibrium
Ashlagi et al. (2012) first prove that for any claim game based on a divi-
sion rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals and order preservation
of awards, all Nash equilibria induce equal division. They then show that
a division rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals and claims
monotonicity, all Nash equilibria induce equal division if the number of players
is less than or equal to 3. Finally, they establish that a division rule satisfying
efficiency, equal treatment of equals, claims monotonicity and nonbossiness, all
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Nash equilibria induce equal division. However, none of these properties are
necessary for division rules in order for all Nash equilibria of a claim game to
induce equal division (see Appendix 4.2). Here, we introduce a property that
is necessary for a division rule to achieve equal division at all Nash equilibria.
Let Γ(R) be a claim game played by n players, with R satisfying claims
boundedness and efficiency when sum of the claims does not exceed E. Let C∗
be the set of all Nash equilibria of Γ(R). Let us have R(c∗) = (E
n
, . . . , E
n
) ∈ Rn
for all c∗ ∈ C∗. We show in the following proposition that, if the total claim is
greater than E, there exists at least one player who gets more than whatever
is leftover from E after sum of other agents’ claims deducted.
Proposition 6. Let R be a division rule satisfying claims boundedness and
efficiency when cN ≤ E. Now, if all Nash equilibria of the claim game Γ(R)
lead to equal division of E, then R satisfies the following property:
There exists i ∈ N such that Ri(c) > E − cN\{i} whenever cN > E.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that for all i ∈ N , we have Ri(c) ≤ E−cN\{i}
when cN > E. Now, let c = (c1, . . . , cn) be such that cN = E and cj > cj′ for
some j, j′ ∈ N with j 6= j′. Then there exists k ∈ N such that ck 6= En .
Claim 2. R(c)=c.
Proof. Since cN = E, R satisfies claims boundedness and efficiency, i.e., we
have Ri(c) ≤ ci (1) for all i ∈ N and RN = E (2). Now, (1) and (2) imply
that Ri(c) = ci for all i ∈ N .
Claim 3. c is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(R).
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists i′ ∈ N and c¯i′ ∈ Ci′ such
that Ri′(c¯i′ , c−i′) > Ri′(c). Let c¯ = (c¯i′ , c−i′).
1. If c¯i′ < ci′ , then c¯N = c¯i′ + c¯N\{i′} = c¯i′ + cN\{i′} < cN = E. Therefore,
R satisfies claims boundedness and efficiency for the set of claims, c¯. In
particular, Ri′(c¯) ≤ c¯i′ < ci′ = Ri′(c), a contradiction. Here, the last
equality comes from Claim 2.
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2. If c¯i′ > ci′ , then c¯N = c¯i′ + cN\{i′} > cN = E. Therefore, Ri′(c¯) ≤
E − c¯N\{i′} = E − cN\{i′} = ci′ = Ri′(c), a contradiction. Here, the last
inequality comes from the assumption made at the beginning.
Hence c is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(R).
Therefore, we find a Nash equilibrium at which agents receive unequal
payoffs, in particular, Rk(c) = ck 6= En , a contradiction.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we study n-player division games in which an estate is to be
allocated among players. Instead of fixing a rule for the division games, we
determine the properties that division rules have to satisfy in order for Nash
equilibria of these games to meet certain criteria. First, we require rules to
satisfy CFC and show that giving each agent the equal division of the estate
is a Nash equilibrium outcome. We, then, show that all Nash equilibria of
the games that are played based on these rules lead to equal division. Ashlagi
et al. (2012), also, introduce properties that are sufficient for division rules
under which all Nash equilibria induce equal division. However, CFC does
not necessarily imply those properties. Therefore, our result provides an
alternative sufficient condition to those presented in Ashlagi et al. (2012).
We, next, show that if claims boundedness and CED are imposed on a division
rule, equal division of the estate is a Nash equilibrium outcome. This result
is not very significant for division games with n > 2 players. When the game
is played with 2 players, however, these two conditions imply that the rule
satisfies some other intuitive properties studied in Ashlagi et al. (2012).
Finally, we work with necessary conditions for a division rule, under which
all Nash equilibria outcomes of a game are equal division. We, first, require
the rule to satisfy efficiency and claims boundedness, when sum of all claims
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does not exceed the estate. We, then, prove that if all Nash equilibria of
a game induce equal division, there exists at least one agent who gets more
than the amount which is left after other players’ claims are deduced from the
estate. Although this gives us a necessary condition for all Nash equilibria
to induce equal division, it is not the converse part of the result obtained in
Proposition 1. Therefore, it might be interesting to analyze the additional
properties beside CFC in future works in order to transform Proposition 1
into an if-and-only-if statement.
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APPENDICES
4.1 Sufficiency of CED
The following remarks show that even if the requirements claims boundedness
and CED are satisfied, a division rule does not have to satisfy efficiency or
claims monotonicty.
Remark 8. A division rule R with claims boundedness and CED does not
have to satisfy efficiency. For instance; let n=2, E=1, c1 = 0, c2 = 1 and
c = (c1, c2). Let R1(c) = 0 and R2(c) =
1
2
. Here, we have
∑
i ci ≥ 1 but∑
iRi(c) =
1
2
6= 1. That is, efficiency is not satisfied.
Remark 9. A division rule R with claims boundedness and CED does not
have to satisfy claims monotonicty. For instance; let n=2, E=1, c1 =
3
4
,
c¯1 = 1, c2 =
1
4
, c = (c1, c2) and c
′ = (c¯1, c2). Now, let R1(c) = 34 , R2(c) =
1
4
,
R1(c
′) = 1
2
and R2(c
′) = 1
4
. Clearly, R satisfies claims boundedness and CED.
However, R1(c
′)  R1(c) even though we have c¯1 > c1. That is, R does not
satisfy claims monotonicty.
4.2 Necessity of Properties
We introduce two division rules and show that none of the properties, efficiency,
claims monotonicity, equal treatment of equals, order preservation of awards
and nonbossiness, are necessary conditions for rules in order for all Nash
equilibria of a claim game to induce equal division.
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Let us define two division rules for N = {1, 2} and an estate E; namely, R∗
and R∗∗. By making use of these two rules, the following remarks show that
a division rule R with claims boundedness does not have to satisfy efficiency,
claims monotonicity, equal treatment of equals, order preservation of awards
or nonbossiness, even if the rule rewards all n agents with equal amount, E
n
,
at all Nash equilibria of the claim game. Let R∗ be such that
R∗i (c) =

ci cN ≤ E
min{ci, E2 } cN > E and ci = min{c1, c2}
0 cN > E and ci 6= min{c1, c2}
and let R∗∗ be such that
R∗∗i (c) =

ci cN ≤ E
min{ci, E} cN > E and i = min{j ∈ N : cj = min{c1, c2}}
0 cN > E and i 6= min{j ∈ N : cj = min{c1, c2}}
with c ∈ C and ci ∈ Ci for i ∈ N . It is important to note that R∗ and R∗∗
are division rules and both satisfy claims boundedness property. Moreover,
Γ (R∗) and Γ (R∗∗) have exactly one Nash equilibrium in which each player
claims half of the estate and is rewarded with what he claims. That is, if c¯ =
(c¯1, c¯2) ∈ C is a Nash equilibrium in Γ (R∗) or Γ (R∗∗), we have c¯1 = c¯2 = E2
and R∗(c¯) = R∗∗(c¯) = (E
2
, E
2
).
Remark 10. A division rule R satisfying claims boundedness with all Nash
equilibria of the claim game Γ (R) inducing equal division among all players
does not have to satisfy efficiency. For instance; let n=2, E=1 and R = R∗.
Let, also, c1 =
1
2
, c2 = 1 with ci ∈ Ci. So, R1(c) = 12 and R2(c) = 0. Now, we
have cN ≥ 1 but RN(c) 6= 1, that is, R does not satisfy efficiency although it
satisfies the other required properties.
Remark 11. A division rule R satisfying claims boundedness with all Nash
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equilibria of the claim game Γ (R) inducing equal division among all players
does not have to satisfy claims monotonicty. For instance; let n=2, E=1 and
R = R∗. Let, also, c1 = c2 = 12 and c¯1 = 1 with ci ∈ Ci, c¯1 ∈ C1. So,
R1(c1, c2) =
1
2
and R1(c¯1, c2) = 0. Now, we have c¯1 > c1 but R1(c¯1, c2) 
R1(c1, c2), that is, R does not satisfy claims monotonicty although it satisfies
the other required properties.
Remark 12. A division rule R satisfying claims boundedness with all Nash
equilibria of the claim game Γ (R) inducing equal division among all players
does not have to satisfy equal treatment of equals. For instance; let n=2,
E=1 and R = R∗∗. Let, also, c1 = c2 = 23 with ci ∈ Ci. So, R1(c) = 23
and R2(c) = 0. Now, we have c1 = c2 but R1(c) 6= R2(c), that is, R does
not satisfy equal treatment of equals although it satisfies the other required
properties.
Remark 13. A division rule R satisfying claims boundedness with all Nash
equilibria of the claim game Γ (R) inducing equal division among all players
does not have to satisfy order preservation of awards. For instance; let n=2,
E=1 and R = R∗∗. Let, also, c1 = 23 and c2 = 1 with ci ∈ Ci. So, R1(c) = 23
and R2(c) = 0. Now, we have c2 > c1 but R2(c)  R1(c), that is, R does not
satisfy order preservation of awards although it satisfies the other required
properties.
Remark 14. A division rule R satisfying claims boundedness with all Nash
equilibria of the claim game Γ (R) inducing equal division among all players
does not have to satisfy nonbossiness. For instance; let n=2, E=1 and R = R∗.
Let, also, c1 = c2 =
2
3
and c¯1 =
1
2
with ci ∈ Ci, c¯1 ∈ C1. So, R1(c1, c2) =
R1(c¯1, c2) =
1
2
, R2(c1, c2) =
1
2
and R2(c¯1, c2) = 0. Now, we have R1(c1, c2) =
R1(c¯1, c2) but R2(c1, c2) 6= R2(c¯1, c2), that is, R does not satisfy nonbossiness
although it satisfies the other required properties.
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